Day Of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl HarborIn Day of Deceit, Robert Stinnett delivers the definitive final chapter on America's greatest secret and our worst military disaster. Drawing on twenty years of research and access to scores of previously classified documents, Stinnett proves that Pearl Harbor was not an accident, a mere failure of American intelligence, or a brilliant Japanese military coup. By showing that ample warning of the attack was on FDR's desk and, furthermore, that a plan to push Japan into war was initiated at the highest levels of the U.S. government, he ends up profoundly altering our understanding of one of the most significant events in American history. |
Contents
War May Come Quicker Than Anyone Dreams | 177 |
The Japs Are Blasting Away on the Frequencies | 189 |
A Pretty Cheap Price | 203 |
This Means War | 225 |
The Escape Was North | 243 |
Destroy Anything in Writing | 253 |
Afterword to the Paperback Edition | 261 |
Appendices | 271 |
All Clear for a Surprise Attack | 98 |
An Unmistakable Pattern | 119 |
Watch the Wide Sea | 138 |
A Night with a Princess | 157 |
A Series of War Warnings Issued | 291 |
E Thirtysix Americans Cleared to Read | 317 |
Index | 388 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
5-Num code Admiral Kimmel Air Fleet aircraft Akagi American Army Arthur McCollum attack author's file battleships broadcasts Captain Carrier Divisions Chief communications intelligence consulate copy in author's cruisers cryptographers December decoded decryption diplomatic Dutch espionage FDR's force Fort Shafter Hawaii Hawaiian HIJMS Hitokappu Bay Homer Kisner Honolulu Hoover intercept operators interview Island Japan Japanese naval Japanese warships Joseph Rochefort Laurance Safford Lieutenant Commander located Maru MMRB Morimura Nagumo National Archives Naval District Naval Intelligence naval intercepts Navy Navy's North Pacific November November 26 Oahu October officer Pacific Fleet PHLO PHPT Purple Purple Code radio call sign radio direction finder radio messages radio silence Rear Admiral records Richardson Rochefort secret sent ships staff Stark Station CAST Station H Station HYPO Station US papers submarine TESTM tion Tokyo translated United vessels Vice Admiral Walter Short Washington White House Whitlock Yamamoto
Popular passages
Page 232 - Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on the alert accordingly.
Page 229 - Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war.
Page 170 - Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.
Page 170 - Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent.
Page 216 - The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support — militarily, politically, economically — any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
Page 24 - Suppose my neighbor's home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire. Now, what do I do? I don't say to him before that operation, "Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.
Page 169 - This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.
Page 176 - The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.
Page 177 - In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that [p. 15] in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors.